Stalin. Part 17: Beloved Leader of the Soviet People
The victory not of the revolution, but of everyday life gave Stalin a colossal reliance on the masses. He was called the leader by analogy with the leaders of the revolution, but psychically he was the opposite of the urethral leader, the olfactory "prince of this world", which effectively made him a Soviet tsar and filled a gaping lack of strong political power in Russia.
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1. Become Stalin
The victory not of the revolution, but of everyday life gave Stalin a colossal reliance on the masses. He was called the leader by analogy with the leaders of the revolution, but psychically he was the opposite of the urethral leader, the olfactory "prince of this world", which effectively made him a Soviet tsar and filled a gaping lack of strong political power in Russia.
There were repressions. But masses of people saw something else. They saw the film "Chapaev" and the steamer "Chelyuskin" rescued by brave Soviet pilots. Children in the yard played at Papanin's team [1]. The Stakhanov movement grew and grew stronger. People voluntarily overfulfilled the plan dozens of times. The miner A. G. Stakhanov himself produced 102 tons of coal per shift at a rate of 7 tons. Overfulfillment of the plan caused a significant increase in wages. At the all-Union conference of the Stakhanovites in the Kremlin in 1935, Stalin stated: “Life has become better, comrades. Life has become more fun. " For the overwhelming majority of citizens of the USSR, it was so.
The precise formulations of Stalin's seemingly emotionless speeches reached everyone and formed the collective consciousness of the people. Many consider Stalin's speeches primitive, and himself - vulgar and narrow-minded. There is a misunderstanding that can be dispelled by looking at the situation systematically. Let's highlight the main thing:
1. Olfactory non-verbalism cannot look differently than primitive in snobbish visual perception. Emotionlessness often looks dull. The choice of what everyone needs, and not just one highly intelligent sound "I", smacks of vulgarity.
2. Stalin was not distinguished for eloquence, but was sufficiently developed in sound to find the right words. Most of his listeners were not the intellectual elite. Stalin spoke about what most people needed, in simple and understandable language, with repetitions and explanations.
3. Stalin's words, as befits olfactory meanings aimed at the country's survival, were immediately transformed into oral propaganda slogans: “Be vigilant at the post!”, “Together forever!”, “We give over the plan!”, “Chatting - helping the enemy !”,“Let's come to abundance!”. People heard it every day. This was their reality, and it worked for the specific actions needed by the sense of smell to preserve the integrity of the country.
All this together, in the conditions of the urethral-muscular mentality, worked for the authority of Stalin, which quickly grew into a personality cult. Joseph Dzhugashvili was not the man who was idolized by millions, he was not the Great Stalin. Becoming Stalin was necessary to fulfill the specific role of the olfactory advisor to the leader.
Stalin scolded his son Vasily for his negligence and desire to earn a good grade at school with the authority of his father:
- Do you think you are Stalin? Not. You are not Stalin. Do you think I'm Stalin? Not. I am not Stalin. - He points to his son at the portrait on the wall: - He is Stalin.
In the absence of an urethral leader, Stalin became an olfactory advisor to his urethral-muscular people. When in 1937 the German writer Lyon Feuchtwanger, in a conversation with Stalin, asked a question about the cult of personality, Stalin, with his characteristic humor, replied that the Soviet people had been busy with urgent matters for too long and had no time to develop good taste in themselves.
It is systematically clear that the personality cult was determined by the properties of the mentality of Soviet people, on the one hand, and the properties of Stalin's psyche, on the other. Stalin's personality cult was the natural outcome of olfactory rule in a country historically lacking in strong political power. The personality cult was a necessary condition for the country's survival in the harshest conditions of confrontation with the whole world on the eve of the war, in wartime and during the post-war reconstruction of the national economy. The personality cult of Stalin in the minds of many people was an expression of gratitude to him for a decent standard of living, for the opportunity for everyone to join culture and art, for a stable sense of security, which was provided by the olfactory measure, forming the necessary integrity of the pack - a single Soviet people.
2. Holy liberty and olfactory necessity
The dermal society develops itself through the desire for benefit or profit. The Russian urethral-muscular mentality is deprived of this mechanism rigidly built into the base of the lower vectors and requires filling the top (sound) with the meaning of life, abstract for skin rationalism, only then is it possible for us to advance into the future. Stalin certainly tried to comprehend the laws of Russian self-development. “I am a Russian person of Georgian nationality” - this is how I defined myself. The need for spiritual unity of all peoples under the dome of Russian culture was obvious to him. That is why, before the war, the 100th anniversary of the death of the urethral-sound A. S. Pushkin is widely celebrated, who for centuries fell in love with Russia by the most accurate hit in the main lack of the collective psychic - holy liberty.
In conditions when thousands of people, thrown out of their usual conditions of life into the archetype, were every minute ready to destroy what they considered unfair to themselves, it was unrealistic to raise the people to the sonic heights of Pushkin. The enmity towards the USSR on the part of the West was also insurmountable, where the “Trotsky factor”, passionately preaching against Stalin, was not of the last importance.
Only a more flexible than the dictatorship of the proletariat, the system of governing the people could be opposed to the threat of destruction of integrity. The time for self-development had not yet come, but it was possible to lay the foundations for self-government. In 1936, a new Constitution was adopted in the USSR. The elections became general, direct and secret. The “disenfranchised” who were affected by their rights received the right to vote. Stalin considered such elections to be a whip in the hands of the people against the bureaucratic (party) clans.
During a feast dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the revolution, Stalin made a toast to what was most important to him: “We united this state in such a way that every part of it, which would be torn off from the common socialist state, would not only cause damage the latter, but she could not exist independently and would inevitably fall into someone else's bondage … Therefore, anyone who tries to destroy this single socialist state, who seeks to separate a single part or nationality from it, is an enemy, a sworn enemy of the peoples of the USSR. And we will destroy every such enemy … we will destroy his entire family, his family, everyone who, by their actions or thoughts, encroaches on the unity of the socialist state, we will mercilessly destroy … For the destruction of all enemies, themselves, their kind! The toast was unanimously supported by the audience.
Before the war, in the face of the growing threat from inside and outside the flock, as olfactory Stalin felt, reforming the political system was dangerous, therefore, impossible. His proposal for alternative elections (a whip for self-government of the people) was removed from the Constitution, the idea of a multi-party system was replaced by a “bloc of communists and non-party people”, where non-party people actually did not play any role. It was not Stalin's choice, but a strong partocracy, that is, the local party bureaucracy, caring for their warm places.
Nepotism gradually seized the corridors of power. Those closest to them from the closest, as they believed, "Caucasian" circle, considered themselves entitled to "rest" from revolutionary asceticism and began to lose their sense of reality (rank). Abel Yenukidze, Stalin's cousin, easily dropped out of the inner circle, like Pavel (Papulia) Ordzhonikidze, and after him Sergo. “Russian people of Georgian nationality” had no national or other preferences, except for the security of their own (and country). Only those who guaranteed his survival under the threat could be with Stalin. The rest were subject to isolation and / or destruction.
Let us repeat that the sense of threat is static in the sense of smell, it does not pass even, it would seem, in favorable moments, when the olfactory psychic receives feedback - “safe”. The balance can be upset at any moment, so the zero olfactory nerve is always tuned towards the greatest threat. Until the thunder breaks out, the non-smelling man will not commit an act. The olfactory "man" commits an act before the thunder breaks out, overthrowing the basis of the foundations of those living in the lengths of time - the cause-and-effect relationship. His act seems illogical, out of touch with the previous and subsequent moments, which is impossible for a person who is used to relying on a logical chain of events. If there is no logic, there are two ways: to find logic (intent) - this is how a version of conscious harm arises,or to calm down on the universal conclusion about insanity - this is how the version of mania and other mental disorders of the olfactory villain arises.
3. Was there a conspiracy?
One of the most incomprehensible actions of Stalin is the destruction of the best commanders on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Many, if not all, researchers argue that Stalin effectively beheaded the Red Army with the 1937 repression. Not aiming at a dispute about facts and their interpretation, let's try to look at those events in a systematic way.
The army was not united. Within it there were two, if not warring, then clearly rival groups. Let's conditionally call them "horsemen" and "foot". Budyonny, Voroshilov, Egorov and others were "horsemen", Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Putna, etc. were "on foot". The first group stood for the widespread use of cavalry in the army, the second - for the saturation of the armed forces with equipment, the rejection of horse traction and cavalry. This rough division helps to define in a nutshell the subject of disagreement, which, of course, was not exhausted by horses and tanks. The reasons for the irreconcilability of the two "military camps" of the Red Army lay deep in the psychic unconscious of these groups of people, seeking through themselves to comprehend what is happening and their place in it.
The skin vector is competitive. The desire for a higher rank makes the ambitious skin soldier pursue a career. If he is alsoted, if a high sound idea lives in him, such a military man can achieve noticeable success in his advancement. By all accounts, this was exactly the youngest Marshal of the Red Army Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky. An excellent military specialist, brilliantly educated and devoted to the idea of a world revolution, Tukhachevsky easily moved up the career ladder.
His relations with his superiors, especially with his immediate superior, People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov, did not develop so smoothly. Voroshilov, anal-cutaneous-muscular without top, combined sufficient stability with the necessary mobility. Tukhachevsky, skin-sounding with vision, saw in his boss a narrow-minded and uneducated promoted person who knew little about military science. Tukhachevsky not only thought so, but also openly reprimanded Voroshilov: "Your proposals are incompetent." Served in an emphatically polite tone, such statements sounded humiliating and mocking.
The visual snobbery of the young hero of the Civil War and his sonic fanatical devotion to the idea of an inevitable proletarian revolution around the world could not come to terms with what he thought was narrow-mindedness and retrograde. Tukhachevsky complained to Stalin about Voroshilov, who did not remain in debt and, for his part, called Tukhachevsky a search engine and was out of his mind. Obsessed with technical rearmament, Tukhachevsky often really fell into fantasies, about which specialists on the ground wrote to Voroshilov with concern.
As long as the war between the "horsemen" and "foot soldiers" was conducted in line with constructive criticism (that is, while Stalin needed their confrontation for the benefit of the development of the army), he allowed this. When the "super-grandiose" plans of the "Red Bonaparte" began to openly interfere with the policy of one-man management, Stalin felt a threat to the party dictatorship, and therefore to himself personally. Tukhachevsky was warned, then they stopped letting him go abroad, where he, at his own discretion, even with the best intentions, met with representatives of the ROVS, then he was arrested.
They pointed to him, Uborevich, Cork and Putna, who had been arrested shortly before by the head of the security department of the government, Pauker, and the former commandant of the Kremlin, Peterson. An unconscious sense of threat took on flesh: Stalin realized who specifically opposed his group - the military, the Cheka, the partycrats. These people did not have a unified leadership, but Tukhachevsky, according to Stalin, perfectly suited the role of the leader of the coup. It was necessary to immediately deprive these people of the connections they had developed, isolate, or, better, destroy.
4. The tactics of the coming war
In May 1937, the institution of political controllers - commissars was returned to the army, the military districts were transferred directly to Voroshilov. All this convincingly testifies: for Stalin there was a conspiracy of the military, so he made a choice in favor of a group of "horsemen" loyal to him. He was with them in Grazhdanskaya, when the plans of Trotsky and Tukhachevsky to take Berlin and Warsaw ignominiously failed.
Both Hitler and Tukhachevsky, for completely different reasons, but both, due to the sound-visual psychic, were inclined to take wishful thinking. Each of them, for his part, hoped to wage a rapid offensive war with little blood on foreign territory. In Hitler's terms, this was called a "blitzkrieg." Tukhachevsky saw the coming war as a crushing blow to neighboring Poland, and then, with all stops, until the complete victory of the proletarians of all countries.
Blitzkrieg tactics did not fit into the specifically Russian way of waging war. The natural conditions of Eurasia, including the unique urethral-muscular matrix of the mental unconscious of the Russian people, dictated a different scenario of military operations. Long exhausting defensive battles, crazy courage and an amazingly easy return of each individual life for the sake of preserving the integrity of the country, the harsh climate, the vast and roadless expanses of Russia - all this together sooner or later extinguished the offensive impulse of any, the most ambitious skin enemy, no matter how terrible and technically he did not seem superior at first.
The scenario of the forthcoming war, as well as its inevitability, were clear to Stalin. He knew that the Russians did not lack courage. There was a lack of unity of command and organization. In this regard, Tukhachevsky and his group posed a mortal danger, because, having withdrawn from obedience and acting at their own discretion, the supporters of quick destruction would inevitably fall into the trap of a European collective confrontation with the Soviet Union. This meant the end of the country and the death of its leader. Stalin could not allow this. Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevich were shot.
The coming war demanded a new type of commander - strong experts in their field, clearly understanding and unquestioningly fulfilling the assigned task, narrow specialists ready for feat. Speaking systematically, we needed people with a good bottom and preferably no top vectors. The most prominent representative of this glorious cohort was Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who combined urethral courage, cutaneous organization, anal perseverance and muscular rage towards the enemy. A man of outstanding physical strength, unshakable will and iron discipline, he was at the height of the task entrusted to him by Stalin to preserve life in one separate country - the USSR.
Continue reading.
Other parts:
Stalin. Part 1: Olfactory Providence over Holy Russia
Stalin. Part 2: Furious Koba
Stalin. Part 3: Unity of opposites
Stalin. Part 4: From Permafrost to April Theses
Stalin. Part 5: How Koba became Stalin
Stalin. Part 6: Deputy. on emergency matters
Stalin. Part 7: Ranking or the Best Disaster Cure
Stalin. Part 8: Time to Collect Stones
Stalin. Part 9: USSR and Lenin's testament
Stalin. Part 10: Die for the Future or Live Now
Stalin. Part 11: Leaderless
Stalin. Part 12: We and They
Stalin. Part 13: From plow and torch to tractors and collective farms
Stalin. Part 14: Soviet Elite Mass Culture
Stalin. Part 15: The last decade before the war. Death of Hope
Stalin. Part 16: The last decade before the war. Underground temple
Stalin. Part 17: Beloved Leader of the Soviet People
Stalin. Part 18: On the eve of the invasion
Stalin. Part 19: War
Stalin. Part 20: By Martial Law
Stalin. Part 21: Stalingrad. Kill the German!
Stalin. Part 22: Political Race. Tehran-Yalta
Stalin. Part 23: Berlin is taken. What's next?
Stalin. Part 24: Under the Seal of Silence
Stalin. Part 25: After the War
Stalin. Part 26: The Last Five Year Plan
Stalin. Part 27: Be part of the whole
[1] This episode is beautifully shown in the fairy tale by V. Kataev "The Seven-Flower Flower".
